Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Daniel Patrick Stilinovich v. Delle Auto Trucks Stop
Inc. : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William J. Hansen; Kara Porter; Christensen, Jensen and Powell; Attorneys for Appellee
R. Phil Ivie; Jeffery C. Peatross; David N. Mortensen; Ivie and Young; Attorneys for Appellent
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Daniel Patrick Stilinovich v. Delle Auto Trucks Stop, No. 930365 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5282

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

I'
£

> <S»a* t W I J — .)

w

4

K ,- U
.A 10

DOCKET NO.

qf&a*?
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL PATRICK STILINOVICH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Argument Priority No. 15

vs.
DELLE AUTO TRUCKS STOP, INC.,

Case No. 930365-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH,
PAT B. BRIAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING.

WILLIAM J. HANSEN, #1353
KARA PORTER, #5223
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
801-355-3431
Attorneys for Appellee

R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
801-375-3000

Attorneys for A p p e l ^ 4 j £ 0
Utah Court of Appeals

NOV 1 8 1993

Mary T. Nf>nnan

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL PATRICK STILINOVICH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Argument Priority No. 15

vs.
DELLE AUTO TRUCKS STOP, INC.,

Case No. 930365-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH,
PAT B. BRIAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING.

WILLIAM J. HANSEN, #1353
KARA PORTER, #5223
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
801-355-3431
Attorneys for Appellee

R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
801-375-3000
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

DETERMINATIVE RULE

1

ARGUMENT

1

THE TORT FEASOR'S ACTS WERE MOTIVATED,
AT LEAST IN PART, BY THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
THE EMPLOYER'S INTEREST
THE EMPLOYEE'S CONDUCT WAS OF THE GENERAL KIND THAT HE
WAS EMPLOYED TO PERFORM
THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A JURY
CONCLUSION

1
8
11
16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1989)

1/ 5, 8

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037
(Utah 1991)
1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 14
Hein v. Harris County, 557 S.W. 2d 366
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977)

9

Jefferson v. Rose Oil Co., 232 So.2d 896
(La. Ct. App. 1970)

6

Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986)
Olson v. Staggs-Bilt Homes, Inc., 534 P.2d 1073
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)

12
9, 10, 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement 2d Torts § 317

12

ii

DETERMINATIVE RULE
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
determinative of the issues presented for review.

The complete

text of Rule 56 is reproduced in the addendum of appellant's
principal brief.

Determinative decisions in this case are Clover

v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) and Birkner v,
Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).

Copies of these

cases are also reproduced in the addendum of appellant's
principal brief.
ARGUMENT
THE TORT FEASOR'S ACTS WERE MOTIVATED,
AT LEAST IN PART, BY THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
THE EMPLOYER'S INTEREST
In order to insure a proper application of the elements
announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989), this court should
look to see how the particular elements of the Birkner test have
been applied in other cases. Most importantly, this court should
compare the facts of the case at bar with those found in Clover
v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) .*
x

This court should take note that although the case of Clover
v. Snowbird Ski Resort was discussed at length in Appellant's
Principal Brief, appellee has not addressed this case at all. The
Clover case represents the Utah Supreme Court's holding on how the
issue of the scope of employment should be determined on summary
judgment.
1

The negligent act of which plaintiff complains in this case
was the tort feasor's retrieval of a firearm because of the
presence of a suspicious individual at the Delle Auto Truck Stop.
In order to determine whether this employee's acts were
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving his
master, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances,
including whether the employee was accomplishing the tasks
assigned him by his employer at the time of the negligent act.
Defendant attempts to isolate this court's view of the negligent
act by labeling the tort feasor's actions as the "cleaning" of a
gun, as if plaintiff had asserted that the negligent act was the
manner in which the employee cleaned the firearm.

Plaintiff has

never claimed that Mr. Cowdell was negligent solely because of
how he cleaned his gun.2

Instead, the employee's act of going

out to his car and returning to the store with the firearm was
the negligent act.

Whether the suspicious person had left the

store seconds or minutes before the accident is immaterial; the
2

Again, as in plaintiff's principal brief, plaintiff would
remind the court that the employee, Mr. Cowdell, was not really
cleaning his gun. Instead, he "stuck a thing in the back of the
[the gun] to get some dust out of it and it just discharged."
(Cowdell Dep. at 8, 10) . A more accurate description of Mr.
Cowdell's activities would be fiddling. He pushed a little piece
of wire into the firearm with "a little piece of tissue I put on
the end of it and stuck it in the cylinder. I stuck it in, I
pushed and kind of winded around and pushed on it and that is when
the bullet went off." (Cowdell Dep. at 23).
2

origin of the dirt in the gun is equally irrelevant.
The fact remains, Mr. Cowdell never completely deviated from
his business responsibilities, but continued to do his employer's
work.

If, when the employee left the store to retrieve the

firearm, his only concern was for his personal safety, with no
concern whatsoever for his employerfs interest, he would have
remained outside the store.

Instead, he returned to the store

with the firearm and resumed his post at the cash register.

The

employee's return to the store highlights that the employee was
about his master's business.

The court in Clover stated, "[I]f

the employee has resumed the duties of employment, the employee
is then 'about the employer's business' and the employee's
actions will be 'motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of
serving the employer's interest."'

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042.

Two fact patterns illustrate this point.

In Clover, an

employee of Snowbird Ski Resort, along with another employee of
the

resort, skied four runs before heading down the mountain to

begin their shifts.

Id. at 1039.

On the final run, the employee

decided to jump off a crest on the side of an intermediate run.
The employer knew of this jump, and often instructed people not
to jump off this crest.

There was a sign instructing skiers to

ski slowly at that point on the run.
sign and skied over the crest.

The employee ignored the

When the employee went over the
3

jump, he collided with the plaintiff who was hit in the head and
severely injured.

Id.

The defendant, Snowbird, claimed that the

employee's purpose for skiing the additional four runs was for
his own pleasure and that he was therefore not acting within the
scope of employment as a matter of law.
Utah disagreed.

The Supreme Court of

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1041.

Defendant in the case at bar maintains that the third
element of Birkner, that the employee's conduct must be
motivated, at least in part# by the purpose of serving his
employer's interest, focuses on the employee's state of mind.
This is not accurate.

It is obvious from the application of the

facts in Clover to the standard announced in Birkner that the
Clover court looked to the totality of the circumstances and did
not look into the subjective mental impressions of the employee.
It is inconceivable that at the moment when the employee in
Clover shot off the ski jump he was thinking about Snowbird's
interests.

More likely, he was thinking about the "hang time" he

was enjoying, or perhaps about landing correctly.
In fact, in looking at the third element of the Birkner
test, the Clover court examined whether the employee's deviation
was so substantial as to constitute a total abandonment of
employment.

The court found:

"Under the circumstances of the

instant case, it is entirely possible for a jury to reasonably
4

believe that at the time of accident, [the employee] has resumed
his employment and that [the employee's] deviation was not
substantial enough to constitute a total abandonment of
employment."

Jd. at 1042.

For this reason, the Clover court

concluded that the matter should not have been decided on Summary
Judgment.

Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence before the

trial court was not so one sided as to indicate that the
employee's deviation was substantial enough to constitute a total
abandonment of employment.

The facts of the case indicate that

the employee was, in fact, about his employer's business behind
the cash register.
If one were to follow the defendant's line of reasoning, in
almost all circumstances an employer would not be found liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

An employer could

instruct employees in a trucking firm not to pass other vehicles.
Circumstances could arise where the employee, nonetheless,
attempts to pass a vehicle, and when seeing an oncoming vehicle,
swerves to avoid an accident, colliding with a third party.

When

asked what was going through his mind at the time of the
accident, almost any reasonable person would state that they were
trying to avoid getting hurt, not thinking about their employer's
interest.

Universally, however, such an accident would be

considered within the employee's scope of employment.
5

The court in Clover noted that if the employee had not
accomplished some of the assignments his employer had given him,
it would have been necessary to send a second employee to
accomplish the same purpose.
facts arise here.

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042.

The same

If the employee, in perceiving the threat of

the suspicious individual, had left the store, no one else would
have been there.

Had the employer been aware of this, the

employer would have needed to send someone else.
In Jefferson v. Rose Oil Co.. 232 So.2d 896 (La. Ct. App.
1970), a gas station cashier shot a customer during a dispute
over the customer's failure to pay for gas which had already been
pumped.

Defendant states that insuring payment for 83 cents in

gas was one of the attendant's duties.
10).

(Defendant's brief at

Contrary to this assertion, the court in Jefferson states:

"It may well be that he was not authorized to use force in
collecting for merchandise sold.

Nevertheless, [the employee]

was attempting to collect for the price of the gasoline already
placed in plaintiff's tank.

This was in furtherance of the

employer's business as distinguished from any personal
controversy that may have existed between [the employee] and
plaintiff."

Id. at 898.

It is disputed as to whether Mr. Cowdell, the employee, had
been told whether or not he could possess a gun.
6
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Reasonable minds can differ as to whether the employee was
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving his
employer^ interest.

As a result, summary judgment was improper,

and the trial courtfs judgment should be reversed.
THE EMPLOYEE'S CONDUCT WAS OF THE GENERAL KIND
THAT HE WAS EMPLOYED TO PERFORM
The court in Birkner stated, and the court in Clover
reaffirmed, that the definition of whether an employee's conduct
is of the general kind he is employed to perform is:

"The

employee must be about the employerfs business and the duties
assigned by the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in
a personal endeavor."

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d

1053, 1056-57; Clover. 808 P.2d at 1040 (emphasis added).

Both

parties concede that at the time of the accident, the employee
was behind the cash register, tending to the business which his
employer had assigned him.

No argument has been made that he was

wholly involved in a personal endeavor.

Instead, he was doing

exactly what his employer had asked him to do.3
Defendant cites the case of Hein v. Harris County. 557 S.W.

3

Defendant would argue that he was not doing what his
employer had asked him to do in that he had a firearm. However,
the facts must be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff,
and plaintiff has stated that the employer never told him not to
carry a firearm.
8
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t - facts a r j d

Appeals1 analysis as to the scope of employment in Olson
represents a view that is much more restrictive than Utah law,
not exemplifying the flexibility highlighted in Clover,

The

Birkner test, found in Utah jurisprudence, exhibits some
flexibility so that it can be reconciled individually with any
given set of facts.

M

[T]his court has occasionally used

variations of [the Birkner] approach.

These variations, however,

are not departures from the criteria advanced in Birkner.
Rather, they are methods of applying criteria to specific factual
situations."

Clover. 808 P.2d at 1041.

The Olson decision is mostly conclusory, short on analysis
and facts, and distinguishable for the following reasons.

Like

the case at bar, the court in Olson was faced with a dispute
where the parties had conceded that the accident occurred within
the spatial boundaries and normal time of the employee's
authorized employment.

The court found that the activity

precedent to the injury was not actuated in part by any desire to
serve the master.

Olson, 534 P.2d at 1075.

In Olson, for

reasons that the court could not find in the record below, the
employee pulled his gun from the holster and a third party was
shot.

At the time, the employee had stopped at a gas station to

buy some gas at a gas station where the victim worked as
attendant.
10
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and its employees. The duty of the employer to supervise his
employee can arise even outside the scope of employment.
Appelleefs Brief at 19-20; Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah
1986).

The court in Lane stated:

For example, an employer must exercise reasonable care to
control an employee acting outside the scope of employment
to prevent that employee from creating an •unreasonable risk
of harm to others' if the employee is using an employer's
chattel and the employer 'knows or should know of the
necessity and opportunity for exercising control'.
Lane. 731 P.2d at 492 (quoting Restatement 2d Torts § 317
(1965)).
An application of the Restatement of Torts cited by the
court in Lane, and cited by defendant in its brief, is not
completely applicable to this case.

In Lane, the action

surrounded the use of a vehicle by an employee in the services of
his employer.

Therefore, the court in Lane focused on the

particular facts of that case.
More applicable to the case at bar would be the Restatement
Torts 2d § 317's provisions concerning when a servant is on the
premises of the master, not the use of the master's chattel as in
Lane.
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as
to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a)

the servant
12

(i)

is upon the premises in possession of the master
or upon which the servant is privileged to enter
only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master; and
(b)

the master
(i)

knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control,
(Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the servant was upon the master's
premises, and had the master exercised any prudent measure of
supervision, he would have known that the employee was too young
to serve in the capacity appointed, and he may have become aware
that Mr. Cowdell was in the possession of a firearm.

The

Restatement does not require that the master actually know
anything, only that he has a reason to know of his ability to
control his servant, which must be conceded in this case, and
also that the employer should know the necessity and opportunity
of exercising such control.
The facts before this court show that the employer took no
steps to know of the necessity or opportunity for exercising such
control.

In fact, there was no supervision at all, and any

training in regard to this employment was almost nonexistent.
In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resortf the trial court had
erroneously dismissed the plaintifffs negligent supervision
13

claim.

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1048. The plaintiff had claimed that

Snowbird was negligent in not supervising its employees in regard
to the practice of reckless skiing.

Clover produced evidence

that Snowbird furnished ski passes to employees, was aware of the
dangerous condition created by the jump, and did not do anything
to prevent people from taking the jump.

That evidence alone was

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in regard to
Clover's negligent supervision claim.

Id.

In the case at bar, there was no supervision at all.
Plaintiff claims that a complete lack of supervision can be
negligence and that the issue of negligence should be submitted
to the jury for determination.

Plaintiff claims that the

employee was too young to perform the job given him under the
circumstances.

Those circumstances include the suspicious

clientele to be expected at the establishment and the hours at
which the young person worked.

The employee had little, if any,

training in regard to his employment.

Also, plaintiff claims

that defendant's violation of state liquor laws evidences an
overall negligent attitude towards the supervision of it's
employees.

Numerous problems regarding the employment of Mr.

Cowdell were completely foreseeable by his employer.

The manager

of the Delle Auto Truck Stop assumed that Mr. Cowdell owned a
firearm.

(Morris Dep. at 21)

These factors raise a genuine
14

issue of material fact as to the negligence of Delle Auto Truck
Stop in the supervision of Mr. Cowdell.

Accordingly, summary

judgment should not have been granted, and this court should
reverse the trial court.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the
trial court also exhibit that the trial court was not looking to
whether the supervision of the employee was proper, but whether
the hiring of the employee was proper.

Plaintiff has contended

that it was the supervision of Mr. Cowdell and his training which
was negligently carried out.

The court stated in its findings of

fact that the employer was not aware of any bizarre behavior nor
was there evidence of abnormal attire# such as "rambo" type of
attire, nor that the employee ever made any bizarre or unusual
statements.

The court also found as fact that there was no

evidence that the employee was unfit to perform his job.
(R. 104-105).
The trial court overlooked the fact that there was no
supervision or training of its employee at all.

Simply

contending that an employer is unaware of problems does not
absolve the employer of liability when no supervision whatsoever
is undertaken.

Accordingly, summary judgment was improperly

granted when the matter should have been submitted to a jury.

15

CONCLUSION
Both parties have conceded that this accident occurred within
the spatial boundaries and times set aside for this employee's job.
The employee in this matter had resumed the duties of employment,
and was therefore about his employerfs business.

His actions

were therefore motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of
serving his employer's interest.

The employee was not wholly

involved in a personal endeavor, but was behind the cash
register.

His acts were of the general kind which his employer

had assigned him to do.

The negligent act in this case was Mr.

Cowdell's going to his vehicle to retrieve a firearm in response
to a suspicious entering the truck stop.

This entire action

arises out of his employment, and therefore his actions should be
found within the scope of employment.
A genuine issue of material fact exists whether any
supervision was made by the employer in regard to Mr. Cowdell.
The plaintiff has shown that the employee was of a particularly
young age, had no supervision, little if any training, that the
employer was violating Utahfs liquor laws, and that problems
could be foreseen.

Accordingly, summary judgment should not have

been granted.

16

Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment and remand the matter for trial.
DATED AND SIGNED this J_^>day of November, 1993.

^^^ETFTElfcY-'t:. PEATROSS
^""^ IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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